论文题目：Connections in troubled times: the impact of interlocking bank directorates in Republican China
摘要：I employ a sample of modern Chinese banks in the 1930s to investigate how board connections in an inter-bank network affect their corporate policy decisions. I construct bank networks based on interlocking directorates for the period 1933 - 1936 and find evidence that corporate decisions of banks are inﬂuenced by their social peers — the more directors two banks share with each other, the more similar are their corporate strategies. The analysis also reveals that peer behavior affects a bank’s own decisions not only at the bilateral level but network-wide. Banks with a central position in the boardroom network make the corporate decision less distinctively. Further, the empirical outcomes show that co-moved corporate policies are mainly driven by banks’ intentions to pursue proﬁts and eliminate risks, known as proﬁtability and insurance effects. Overall, the ﬁndings support the view that banks cooperate intimately with each other at board level and interlocking directorates were a critical channel for sharing managerial practices in the 1930s.